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IAEA Safeguards: Evolution and Current Status
Arun Vishwanathan 
Abstract
This essay seeks to trace the evolution and current status of the safeguards system 
implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The article highlights the 
changes safeguards have undergone since the Agency's inception in 1957. Safeguards have 
struck a balance between the twin objectives - of facilitating the spread of nuclear 
technology for peaceful uses and verification of non-proliferation commitments of NPT 
state parties - that the IAEA was supposed to fulfil. While some changes in the safeguards 
took place as a response to the spread of civil nuclear technology, other changes have been 
a reaction to the challenges posed to the non-proliferation regime from the Iraqi and North 
Korean disclosures. The essay concludes with an assessment of the changes which took 
place with the coming of Additional Protocol and provides an assessment of the current 
status of the safeguards across the globe. 
This essay seeks to study the evolution and current status of existing International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. To this end, it begins by tracing out the 
evolution of the IAEA and the manner in which nuclear safeguards have changed since the time 
the IAEA was set up in 1957. The change in the nature of Agency safeguards have either been a 
result of a general improvement in civil nuclear technology used by countries (which 
necessitates a corresponding improvement in safeguarding techniques) or as a response to the 
challenges posed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
IAEA: Robin Hood to Sheriff1
The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) establishment in 1957 had its 
genesis in the ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech delivered by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower at 
the United Nations in 1953 (Eisenhower 1953:62-67). The Agency since its inception has had 
to balance dual and sometimes contradictory roles. These twin roles were firstly to promote 
peaceful uses of nuclear technology for uses like generation of power and secondly ensuring 
that nuclear technology was not used by any member state for military purposes. It is in 
fulfilling the second role that safeguards come in handy and assume an important role. 
The IAEA’s mandate thus from the very beginning has been to facilitate access to the 
peaceful benefits of nuclear technology while developing and implementing an international
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nuclear safeguards system which guards against diversion of nuclear technology and materials 
meant for peaceful uses to military applications like manufacturing nuclear weapons 
(Scheinman 2003:7). The Atoms for Peace initiative which led to the establishment of the 
IAEA, thus catalysed sharing and dissemination of nuclear know-how across the globe. 
The fact that expansion of civil nuclear programmes and the dangers of proliferation of 
nuclear weapons share a close relationship is a well-known truth. In fact, Hannes Alven has 
very succinctly remarked that “the peaceful atom and the military atom are Siamese twins” 
(cited in Scheinman 2003:7). The safeguards system has thus proven to be an indispensable 
instrument for promoting nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation ever since 
the Agency was founded in 1957 (International Atomic Energy Agency 2005:5). 
Under the auspices of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
the IAEA has two major roles. The first role is to employ international nuclear safeguards, in 
accordance with Article III of the NPT. This is to verify the commitment to peaceful uses of 
nuclear technology assumed by non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT. This role of the 
IAEA ensures that nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology go hand in 
hand and the spread of nuclear energy or technology does not result in proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. 
To prevent such possible diversion, the NPT has made it mandatory for all non-
nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) parties to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements 
(CSA) with the IAEA, thereby placing under safeguards all sources or special fissionable 
material (British American Security Information Council and Oxford Research Group 2005). 
Article III of the NPT states that all non-nuclear weapon states must “accept safeguards, as set 
forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose 
of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under [the NPT]…” (International 
Atomic Energy Agency 1970, Article III). The onus is thus placed on the Agency to provide 
credible assurance to the international community that the NNWS are not diverting nuclear 
material meant for peaceful uses to weapons-use. 
The second major function of the IAEA is to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
This role flows out of Article IV of the NPT which is aimed at “the further development of the 
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-
nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty, with due consideration to the needs of the developing 
areas of the world” (International Atomic Energy Agency 1970:Article IV). 
The dual roles of promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and non-proliferation 
objectives are enshrined in Article II of the IAEA’s Statute. In Article II, the Agency’s 
objectives are formulated as to seek “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic 
energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.” Further, the IAEA’s statute adds, 
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“so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it, … is not used in such a way as to further any 
military purpose” (International Atomic Energy Agency 1956:Article II). To this end, the IAEA 
supports research and development in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promotes scientific 
and technical exchange, provides technical assistance to its 155 member states, administers 
safeguards verification of nuclear materials, draws up and regularly updates standards for 
nuclear safety and radiation protection (Klerk 2001). 
In addition to the above, the Agency also verifies compliance with regard to the five 
regional nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties. It is important to note that all NWFZ 
member states are required to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements. In addition, the 
states are also required to have in-force an Additional Protocol to their existing safeguard 
agreements so as to ensure the absence of possible undeclared material and activities. 
The IAEA Safeguards System: The Evolutionary Phase
At the very outset, when IAEA safeguards system were being designed, many states 
including India viewed them as impinging upon state sovereignty and a tactic of developed 
states to deny technology to developing countries. A mistrust existed in governments with 
regard to the idea of international verification (Nehru 1961:191-95).2 The task was made more 
difficult given the fact that nothing in the Agency’s statute required a member state to accept 
safeguards on its nuclear activities or to implement IAEA safeguards on bilateral agreements. 
Thus, initially, the IAEA statute limited safeguards to three situations. First, where the Agency 
was the supplier or an intermediary; secondly, when a state unilaterally requested safeguards on 
its activities; and thirdly, when application of safeguards was requested by members to bilateral 
or multilateral agreement (Scheinman 2005:5).3
The speed at which the safeguards system grew were dictated by political and 
pragmatic considerations. Firstly, important member states, including the Soviet Union, saw no 
urgency in operationalising the provisions on safeguards mentioned in the IAEA statute thereby 
limiting the development of safeguards in the early years. The Soviets subsequently changed 
their stance and extended support to strengthened safeguards in 1963 (Fischer 1997, 249). The 
immediate need to put safeguards in place was triggered due to a Japanese request for IAEA 
assistance in procuring nuclear material for a research reactor in 1959 (Vishwanathan 2006). 
As the Agency lacked any hands-on experience in implementing safeguards it chose to 
begin with small and simple facilities and incrementally move to larger and more complex ones 
as and when the need arose (Fischer 1997:40-67). As a result of this, the first model safeguards 
agreement developed by the IAEA, namely the INFCIRC/26-type safeguards, covered only 
research reactors upto 100 MWth. It is also important to note the fact that the civilian facilities 
in existence at that point in time were only of this size. The limited nature of the INFCIRC/26 
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safeguards was also the result of the lack of trust/acceptance on the part of member states with 
the idea of international verification of their facilities, material (Klerk 2001). 
In 1964, the INFCIRC/26 was expanded in scope to cover large power reactors. This 
was followed by a completely revised safeguards document, INFCIRC/66 which was approved 
by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1965. The type-66 safeguards – as those modelled on the 
INFCIRC/66 were called - was revised subsequently to include other facilities in the civilian 
nuclear fuel cycle and by  1968 the 66-type safeguards covered all facilities except enrichment 
plants which were still limited in number (Klerk 2001). At this point in time, safeguards were 
applied on a facility-by-facility basis rather than to the state and its activities as a whole. They 
were thus called facility-specific safeguards (Scheinman 2005:5-6).
With the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, 
international safeguards were strengthened and expanded. All non-nuclear-weapon state parties 
under the NPT were obligated to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA covering all of the state’s peaceful nuclear activities, present and future, “with a view to 
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices” (International Atomic Energy Agency 1970, Article III(1)) With the NPT 
coming into force, a safeguards committee (open to all member states of the Agency) was 
established by the Agency’s Board of Governors to advise the IAEA on the contents of 
safeguards agreements to be concluded between non-nuclear-weapon states and the IAEA. The 
committee developed a document entitled “The Structure and Content of Agreements between 
the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapon” which was approved in 1972 and became the model for comprehensive 
safeguards agreements we know as Agency Information Circular INFCIRC/153 (International 
Atomic Energy Agency 1972).4 The 153-type safeguards are the basis for, and central to, the 
current safeguards system which are in force in a large majority of the safeguarded facilities 
across the globe. 
A different set of benefits and responsibilities for the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) 
and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) under the NPT also fashioned the evolution of the 
various types of safeguards. The nature of the NPT resulted in the IAEA following three types 
of safeguards templates.  
The first is the Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) safeguards. All nuclear weapon 
states have concluded VOA safeguard agreements with the Agency. The IAEA implements 
VOA safeguards in some or all of the peaceful facilities of these states. Under the VOAs, 
facilities or nuclear material in facilities notified to the IAEA by the State concerned are offered 
for the application of safeguards. The Agency is benefited by implementing the VOAs 
safeguards as it gains experience in implementing safeguards in advanced facilities. 
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The second type of safeguards is the 153-type safeguards. The Agency applies such safeguards 
in the case of non-nuclear weapon states. They are also known as comprehensive or full-scope 
safeguards. Under such an agreement, a State undertakes to accept safeguards on all nuclear 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities, within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried 
out under its control anywhere (emphasis added). Nuclear material in such an agreement would 
include all fissile material that could be used in making nuclear weapons like Highly Enriched 
Uranium (HEU), Plutonium and Uranium-233. It would also include natural, low enriched and 
depleted uranium as well as thorium (International Atomic Energy Agency 1972, paragraph II). 
Under these safeguard agreements, the IAEA has the right and obligation to ensure that 
safeguards are applied on all such nuclear material and that the material is not diverted to 
weapons use (IAEA Department of Safeguards 2007:7). 
Safeguarding activities under the 153-type comprise of three major elements. These are 
namely nuclear material accountancy, containment and surveillance measures and on-site 
inspections. Nuclear material accountancy primarily seeks to account the quantity - and the 
change if any - of fissile material in the facility.  Containment and surveillance in essence uses 
physical measures like walls, seals, cameras etc, in an attempt to control the access and thereby 
preventing any diversion of fissile material to non-peaceful uses. The IAEA uses on-site 
inspections to verify whether all the fissile material declared by the agency exists in the facility 
and checks whether there has been any diversion to non-intended use either within or outside 
the facility (Klerk 2001:3).  
An addition to the 153-type safeguards is the small quantities protocol (SQP). States 
which have minimal or no nuclear activities - as part of their full-scope or comprehensive 
safeguards agreements - conclude a small quantities protocol (SQP). Similar to the evolution in 
other forms of safeguards, the SQP too has witnessed a change over time. As per the original 
draft of the SQP which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1974, the 
“implementation of most of the safeguards procedures in Part II of a comprehensive safeguards 
agreement are held in abeyance as long as certain criteria are met” (International Atomic 
Energy Agency 1974; International Atomic Energy Agency 2011:4). This was however 
modified in 2005, when the IAEA Board of Governors revised the standard text of the SQP. 
Most importantly, this changed the eligibility criteria, which meant that a state “with an 
existing or planned facility” could not enter into a SQP with the IAEA. Additionally, the 
provisions which were kept in abeyance in the original text of the SQP, like the requirement of 
the member state to provide the IAEA with an initial inventory report and secondly the 
Agency’s right to carry out ad hoc and special inspections were no longer held in abeyance 
(International Atomic Energy Agency 1974; International Atomic Energy Agency 2006). 
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The third is the 66-type safeguards (facility/item specific safeguards) which is applied 
only on specific material, facilities and other items which are placed under safeguards. These 
safeguards are based on the safeguards procedures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors 
and publicised via IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 (International Atomic 
Energy Agency 1968). The IAEA implements 66-type agreements in the three states namely -
India, Pakistan and Israel – all of whom are not party to the NPT. 
Figure 1 below shows the number of facilities across the globe under various types of 
safeguards during 2012 (International Atomic Energy Agency 2012a:100).
Figure 1: Number of Facilities under different types of safeguards during 2012
Source: IAEA Annual Report 2012, Annex: Table A5, p.100.
The Consolidation Phase
The major issue at hand immediately after the coming into force of the NPT was to 
ensure the participation of the “free-world advanced industrial non-nuclear weapon states in the 
NPT” (Scheinman 2005:6). As many of these countries were developing national nuclear 
industries they were concerned about the implication of comprehensive safeguards which were 
to be implemented only by non-nuclear weapon states. Thus, in order to meet their concerns the 
NPT affirmed the “inalienable right” to pursue peaceful use of nuclear energy (International 
Atomic Energy Agency 1970:Article IV).5
These states, unlike India, were ready to accept a treaty that distinguished between 
nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states in terms of their rights and responsibilities.6 However, 
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these states were not willing to accept even for a limited time, the extension of such 
discrimination to the civil nuclear field. Thus, the non-nuclear-weapon states directed their 
energies at establishing a safeguards regime that reduced intrusion and gave NNWS maximum 
freedom to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes while providing the necessary level of 
confidence regarding non-proliferation of the technology for military purposes. 
A large number of these states were concerned about protecting their proprietary and 
commercial interests and limiting the intrusiveness of the on-site inspections. They were also 
concerned about the existing (facility-specific) system of safeguards as it allowed too much 
discretion on the part of the Agency, and was too liberal with regard to the frequency of 
inspection and too permissive in terms of  scope of access provided to the inspectors in the 
safeguarded facilities (Scheinman 2005:8).
The North Korean and Iraqi Disclosures
The lacunae in the 153-type of safeguards came to light when the North Korean and the 
Iraqi cases came to light. It brought to fore the fact that these safeguards were capable of 
assuring correctness of the information provided by the states and not whether the information 
was complete in all respects.7 The Iraqi inspections carried out in the wake of the 1991 Gulf 
War by the UNSCOM under the mandate of the UN Security Council Resolution 687 
discovered “an extensive covert nuclear weapon program in addition to, and partly in proximity 
to, its open nuclear research activities that were under IAEA safeguards” (Herdman 1995:
Foreword). The limitations of the comprehensive safeguards were underscored in this case as 
Iraq was able to misguide the Agency all these years despite being a party to the NPT and 
having in place comprehensive safeguards. The following year the IAEA also discovered North 
Korea had been withholding the extent of its fissile material production, in particular plutonium 
reprocessing activity, from the IAEA.
The Iraqi and the North Korean revelations severely undermined the effectiveness of 
the existing IAEA safeguards regime. This led the then-IAEA Director General Hans Blix to 
assess that the Agency needed expanded access to three items – information; physical access to 
the sites under safeguards; and wider access to the U.N. Security Council (Scheinman 2005:
12). The modification to the safeguards system were put in place based on these assumptions. 
In response to the several difficult questions that arose as a result of the Iraqi and the 
North Korean disclosures, the Agency initiated a program to expand its verification and 
capabilities. The Board of Governors took a number of decisions that reaffirmed the 
requirement that safeguards should provide the completeness as well as the correctness of 
nuclear material declarations by states under comprehensive safeguards system.
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These new measures were gradually put in place. The measures in the first phase, 
adopted by the Board of Governors in 1992, included a call for universal reporting system 
under which all parties were invited to voluntarily notify the IAEA about transfers of nuclear 
equipment and specified non-nuclear materials. The board hoped that the provision of such data 
on exports, imports, and the production of nuclear materials would help to create a “closed 
system” containing the global balancing of source materials. The board also affirmed the right 
of the IAEA to conduct special inspections with the full backing of the UNSC, should the 
Agency’s request for a special inspection be denied (Zak 2002:18-20).
The first two requirements were to be implemented by the IAEA. The Agency took 
steps to shore up its detection capabilities, especially in case of undeclared nuclear installations. 
With regard to special inspections, the ball was in the Security Council’s court. In January 
1992, the Council issued a declaration stating that its members “regarded the proliferation of all 
weapons of mass destruction as constituting a threat to international peace and security,” and 
noting that it would take “appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to [it] by 
the IAEA” (United Nations Security Council 1993).
Strengthening of IAEA Safeguards
Though the right to conduct special inspections as well as other measures put in place 
were definitely a big step forward, the IAEA realised that it was not enough just to have these 
rights but not have any substantive facts to back them up with. As the Agency did not have any 
means to gather intelligence, it largely had to depend upon informal mechanisms or more 
importantly, upon its member states’ national technical means (NTM).  
The IAEA Board of Governors reaffirmed the right of special inspections and clarified 
that the right was not limited to activity at declared sites. What this meant for all practical 
purposes was that the right of inspections was extended to locations other than those declared to 
the Agency by the state concerned (Zak 2002:22–24). Touching upon the point of lack of 
intelligence gathering capabilities the Board also said in clear terms that a request for special 
inspections could be based upon credible information collected from sources such as national 
intelligence provided to the Agency by a state. Such a position clarified and laid out the 
situation under which a special inspection could be requested. Also it resulted in clarifying the 
section on special inspections under 153-type safeguards (International Atomic Energy Agency 
1972:Paragraph II).8
Following the Iraqi and the North Korean disclosures, the Agency began to explore 
adoption of new kinds of technologies for inspection purposes. The first was satellite imagery 
and the second was environment sampling also known as high-performance trace analysis. In 
the North Korean case as well as the Iraqi case, satellite pictures provided by the United States 
to the IAEA were the basis for inspections conducted by the Agency. In the North Korean case, 
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satellite imagery provided by the US led to the discovery of two undeclared storage facilities 
and in the Iraqi case it led to the correct determination of the size of the Al-Tuwaitha nuclear 
site (Perricos 2001). 
Environmental sampling is also a technique which has been employed by the Agency 
on a wide scale after the Iraqi and North Korean disclosures. Environmental sampling is based 
on the premise that nuclear activity like other industrial and manufacturing processes releases 
some process material into the environments. As nuclear material possess distinctive physical 
properties apart from being radioactive, it is possible to even detect minute emissions or losses 
during activity. This is extremely important for maintaining the safe operation of nuclear 
facilities (Pellaud and Hooper). However, the same fact can also be used to detect diversion of 
nuclear material and equipment for proscribed purposes. Samples of air, water, or even swabs 
taken from surfaces of nuclear plants or equipment can be analysed for radioactive traces 
(Fischer 1997:71–72). In the case of North Korea, such environmental sampling enabled the 
Agency to arrive at the conclusion that North Korea had not disclosed the correct amount of 
plutonium which had been separated. 
The Agency has carried out field tests demonstrating the usefulness of environmental 
monitoring in 11 member states. The samples collected as part of such efforts have been 
distributed in specialized laboratories in the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, 
Australia, Canada, Finland, and Hungary (Hooper 1995:17). The IAEA is working on a project 
called the “Novel Techniques and Instruments for Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Materials, 
Activities and Facilities.” The project seeks to develop better techniques to detect activities 
associated with nuclear processes. Such techniques complement and at times supplement 
intelligence provided to the Agency by member states of any diversion or proscribed activity. 
Sampling of releases from the facility allows the Agency’s inspectors to remotely monitor the 
occurrence of any prohibited activity. Laser-based methods have demonstrated real-time 
monitoring of atmospheric materials, on-site chemical analysis and the capability of detecting a 
previous exposure to ionising radiation (Khlebnikov, Parise, and Whichello 2008:1-2). The 
IAEA is also fielding such technologies at facilities which it is safeguarding in a manner 
whereby the collected data is transmitted to the Agency in an encrypted form at regular 
intervals. 
Program 93+2
Since the North Korean and Iraqi disclosures, the Agency’s focus shifted to early 
detection of undeclared activities. To this end, it mandated the Standing Advisory Group on 
Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) to explore ways of enhancing the Agency’s early 
detection abilities. This led to the IAEA Program (93+2). The program was called so because it 
was initiated in 1993 and was expected to conclude its work in two years in 1995, prior to the 
NPT Review and Extension Conference. 
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The program’s aim was to strengthen and improve the cost-effectiveness of the IAEA 
safeguards system. As the Agency’s Annual Report states, the aim of the program 93+2 was to 
“strengthen the safeguards system and in particular to develop its ability to detect and to have 
access to undeclared activities” (International Atomic Energy Agency 1997a:49). In contrast to 
the 153-type safeguards, the new safeguards system would seek to verify the absence of any 
undeclared nuclear activities and material anywhere in the given state not just in the 
declared sites. Program 93+2 sought an expanded declaration which would help the Agency to 
assess the completeness of the activities in a state. The program also sought to use 
environmental sampling and carry out special inspections to increase the assurance the IAEA 
could provide of the absence of any undeclared activity (Herdman 1995). 
Under Program 93+2, two sets of measures were envisioned. One did not require any 
additional legal backing and were possible under the rubric of the framework of the 153-type 
safeguards which were in place. These tools had been available to the IAEA inspectors but had 
not been fully utilized (Vishwanathan 2006:2). Examples of such tools included providing 
advance design information to the IAEA of a new facility or changes, modifications to an 
existing facility; use of remote monitoring, environmental sampling and short-notice 
inspections in facilities already under safeguards. In addition, the Agency also decided to 
synergise the use of open source information with the declarations made by members in 
addition to request member states to voluntarily report imports and exports of nuclear material 
and equipment (Vishwanathan 2007:2).
Additional Protocol
The second set of changes envisioned under Program 93+2 required enhanced 
cooperation from the states as these measures fell outside the Agency’s mandate as it existed. 
Thus, member states were required to approve such measures on an individual basis by signing 
an Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol is “a voluntary agreement between a state and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that is additional to an existing safeguards 
agreement and seeks to verify both the correctness of declared activities and materials and 
absence of undeclared activities and materials.” (Emphasis added) The Model Additional 
Protocol (INFCIRC/540) was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997.   
In order to arrive at an assessment of the country’s activities and in order to verify the 
correctness of the member state’s declaration and the absence of any undeclared activities, the 
Additional Protocol required that member states provide additional information to the Agency. 
Such information included any exports the country undertakes both of nuclear and non-nuclear 
material. Secondly, it also required the country to provide details of existing stocks, exports and 
imports of uranium and thorium; as well as general description of all buildings on the 
safeguarded facility regardless of their use or contents. An Addition Protocol signatory was 
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also required to be submitted to the IAEA plans for a ten-year period which were relevant to the 
development of the nuclear fuel cycle. 
In addition, the Additional Protocol also sought to expand the access of the Agency’s 
inspectors so that they could verify the absence of undeclared material or activity even outside 
safeguarded facilities. Such access known as “Complementary Access” envisioned – on the 
IAEA Board’s approval - location-specific environmental sampling and wide-area 
environmental sampling (Fischer 1997:72–73). 
In other words, the Additional Protocol would act as a complementary legal document 
for states that already had a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA.  According to 
former IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei, the Additional Protocol was not intended for use as a 
stand-alone document, first, because “no state could adhere to the protocol unless it had 
previously concluded a safeguards agreement with the agency,” and second, because “the 
protocol depended in many ways on the underlying safeguards agreement” (ElBaradei 
1997:Attachment II).
The Additional Protocol is a bilateral agreement between member states and the IAEA 
and is not a multilateral treaty. Thus, every state must adopt the protocol unilaterally. In 
addition, there is neither a threshold – a minimal number of states required for the entry into 
force of the protocol – nor a timeframe within which INFCIRC/153 states must adopt the 
protocol.
Unilateral adoption has positive as well as negative implications. On the one hand, if a 
minimal number of states – or specific states – were required for the protocol to enter into 
force, the significance of individual states would expand, and the political pressure to join 
would be extensive. Each state would in essence hold a veto against the agreement’s entry into 
force and could be expected to leverage the power to maximize political gains.
But the legal situation under the Additional Protocol is different. Because there is 
neither a minimal number of states nor a specific list of states needed to ratify the protocol. 
Each state must, as noted, adopt the protocol independently of other states. In other words, each 
state is responsible only for the entry into force of its own agreement. Consequently, the 
political pressure that states can impose upon one another to adopt the protocol is limited 
(International Atomic Energy Agency 2009).
Though targeted to be adopted by member states following the 153-type safeguards, the 
five nuclear weapon states as well as member states implementing facility-specific safeguards 
(International Atomic Energy Agency 1968) were also encouraged to adopt measures from the 
Additional Protocol which would strengthen international non-proliferation efforts 
(International Atomic Energy Agency 1997b:1–2). Figure 2 below depicts the increase in the 
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number of countries where additional protocol has entered into force between 1997 and 2013 
(International Atomic Energy Agency 2012c:1-3). 
Figure 2: Countries where Additional Protocols have entered into Force (1997-2013)  
Source:  IAEA Website
The approved Program 93+2, in both its parts, encompasses complementary activities 
vital to resolving questions about the correctness and completeness of the information provided 
in a state’s declaration, as well as resolving inconsistencies relating to that information. As 
Chen Zak points out, the additional measures cover three fields which include expansion of the 
information states must provide IAEA with; expansion of access rights for the IAEA and its 
inspectors; and thirdly, streamlining of administrative procedures for effective implementation 
of safeguards. 
Expansion of the information provided 
The declarations that states are required to submit under Program 93+2 cover a much 
broader ambit as compared to those required under 153-type safeguards. The requirements go 
beyond declaring nuclear material and related activity. States implementing 153-type 
safeguards are required to submit a declaration covering only nuclear materials, associated 
processes (if contained nuclear materials need to be under safeguards), and nuclear facilities 
containing or expected to contain declared nuclear material. 
However, under the changes carried out as part of the Program 93+2, states were 
expected to declare and identify all buildings on a particular site whether or not they were being 
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used for nuclear use. The expanded information, in conjunction with verification activities, 
were aimed at making the state's nuclear fuel cycle and associated activities more transparent.
The expanded declaration represents a significant additional commitment in other ways 
as well. Before the strengthening of the safeguards took place under Program 93+2, states 
implementing 153-type safeguards were permitted to carry out unsafeguarded military activities 
as long as such activities were not related to nuclear weapons. However, with the Program 
93+2 coming into play, states had to file a complete declaration outlining their past, present and 
future nuclear related activities regardless of whether these activities were peaceful or military. 
In addition, states were required to provide IAEA inspectors with access in order to verify their 
declaration (Lu 1998:4). 
Expansion of access rights
Under 153-type safeguards, the access rights for verification were restricted to the 
“strategic points” in declared facilities. The IAEA selects these points by examining the design 
information of declared sites (or, in certain cases, the facilities themselves) and then 
designating locations at which the agency can obtain and verify the information necessary for 
implementing its safeguards measures. A strategic point would be a place where measurements 
could be conducted and where containment and surveillance measures are executed 
(International Atomic Energy Agency 1997b:Article B III (a), (b)).
Under the Additional Protocol, the access provided to the Agency inspectors were 
expanded. This now included any place on a site which was safeguarded; uranium mines, 
uranium or thorium concentration/ processing plants as well as previously undeclared or 
decommissioned facilities (International Atomic Energy Agency 1997b, Article B III (a)).
In addition to expanding the access provided to the Agency's inspectors, the Additional 
Protocol also grants complementary access rights to the IAEA inspectors. This is to verify the 
completeness and correctness of states' declarations; a determination which the Agency is 
unable to make in states which do not have the Additional Protocol in force. Under 
complementary access, the inspectors have access to more locations pertaining to the nuclear 
fuel cycle and research locations not directly involving nuclear material; nuclear-related 
manufacturing locations as well as access to locations where imported equipment and material 
is stored. (International Atomic Energy Agency 1997b:Article B III (b))
In addition to expanding the overall access provided by the states to the inspectors, the   
Program 93+2 also streamlined no-notice inspections. Under such inspections, inspectors can 
arrive at the facility without advance notice. Such inspections are useful to effectively verify 
material flows at large facilities and to confirm the status of facilities which have been shut-
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down or decommissioned as well as facilities which are under-construction. Such inspections 
are useful to verify that facilities are not used for clandestine or proscribed purposes. 
However, given their intrusive nature, no-notice inspections are very rare and the 
Additional Protocol does not prescribe any specific provisions about such inspections. There 
are limitations imposed on the no-notice inspections which includes their limited access to 
strategic points in the facilities. Inspections conducted by the IAEA inspectors generally fall 
under the 'announced' inspections requiring 24-hour advance notice and short-notice 
inspections requiring 2-hour advance notice. However, under the Additional Protocol, 
inspections require advance notification and it allows for two-hour 'short' notice inspections. 
Under Article B III (c) the Additional Protocol also grants the IAEA rights to conduct 
environmental sampling. Another method of environmental sampling has also been approved. 
This is wide-area environmental sampling, which is aimed at establishing whether nuclear 
activities are present at sites to which the IAEA did not previously have access rights. Although 
the Additional Protocol recognizes the right of the IAEA to deploy such monitoring in order to 
search for nuclear indications over extensive areas (in contrast to location-specific monitoring), 
wide-area environmental sampling would be implemented only when the efficacy of the 
technology is established and the board of governors approves the circumstances, details, and 
analytical method of the sampling. In any case, future wide-area environmental sampling would 
be implemented as part of the AP only after consultations with the state concerned (Zak 
2002:15). 
There is a slight difference in terms of the access the states are required to provide to 
the inspectors in cases of detection of undeclared material or activities; to assess completeness 
and correctness of declarations and thirdly, for carrying out environmental sampling. The 
Agency requires the states to provide access to the inspectors in case where they are conducting 
verifications to detect undeclared materials or activities. However, in the other two cases, some 
leeway is given to the state wherein it can satisy the Agency's requirements through some other 
means if it cannot provide the access requested by the IAEA's inspectors (Lu 1998:7–8). 
Streamlining of administrative procedures 
This includes, for example, procedural simplification for the designation of inspectors, 
and approval of multi-entry visas which are valid for at least one year since the date of issue. 
Multi-entry visas permit inspectors to enter a country without delay, thereby reducing the 
ability of the state to remove traces of illegitimate activity. Other measures adopted include the 
use of unattended, remote-monitoring equipment and new methods of communication between 
onsite inspectors and IAEA headquarters. 
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Conclusion 
As outlined in the 2012 International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards statement, the 
Agency applies safeguards in 179 States. The 2012 safeguard statement mentions that in 2012 
“a total of 183 767 significant quantities of nuclear material and 437 tonnes of heavy water are 
currently under safeguards.” In 2012 alone, the IAEA has carried out 1962 inspections spread 
over 11,859 calendar-days. In terms of safeguards in place in various countries, 114 states have 
both comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and additional protocols in force. In another 
57 states, CSAs are in force without the additional protocol being in force. Three states, 
namely, India, Israel and Pakistan have entered into 66-type or facility specific safeguards 
agreements with the IAEA and these are currently in force in these countries. In addition, all 
the five nuclear weapon states voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force 
(International Atomic Energy Agency 2012b:1-3). 
As seen from the above, the IAEA’s task by way of applying nuclear safeguards in its 
member states is a large, crucial and complicated one. However, it is one that the Agency has 
been carrying out with a fair degree of success. However, if – despite the Fukushima scare –
nuclear energy does witness a renaissance, it will translate into an exponential increase in the 
resources - both personnel and financial - that the Agency will have to employ into 
safeguarding these new facilities. Newer facilities and technological changes will mean new 
implementation of newer safeguard techniques by the IAEA. 
In this context, one of the biggest stumbling blocks before the IAEA is budgetary. The 
increase in the Agency’s membership (post Cold War) has resulted in an expansion of the 
safeguarding-related duties of the IAEA. This coupled with the fact that it is subject to Zero 
Real Growth since 1985 (like all United Nations organisations) means it has to take on the 
additional responsibilities with the same facilities at its disposal. Some member states see this 
as necessary to force the IAEA to prioritise its priorities. However, as Trevor Findlay points 
out, it could have an adverse impact too by possibly harming the Agency’s capability to carry 
out critical parts of its important mandate (Findlay 2012:108, 110–112). Given the crucial tasks 
that the IAEA is mandated to carry out, placing unrealistic financial curbs on the international 
body, while at the same time burdening it with an ever expanding and complicated set of duties 
is unfair at best. Given the yeoman’s service the IAEA has been silently carrying out to further 
international peace and security, the international community should give serious thought to 
how to enable the international body to effectively carry out its mandate. 
Notes
1. Adapted from the title of Dr. C. Raja Mohan’s article in the Indian Express, “Atomic Robin Hood, Nuclear 
Sheriff”, Indian Express, October 10, 2005.
2. Nehru strongly attacked all attempts of setting up an international authority to regulate the development of 
nuclear energy, referring to such plans as “Atomic Colonialism.”
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3. As Lawrence Scheinman states, by the time the IAEA was established in 1957, the US had concluded nuclear 
cooperation agreements with more than twenty states and had included bilateral safeguards rights in all but one 
of those agreements, with the provision that safeguards responsibility could be transferred to an international 
agency once it was established. The exception was an agreement with the newly formed EURATOM, to which 
the US entrusted safeguards responsibility. 
4. Though the nuclear-weapon-states were not obligated to submit to safeguards, they too eventually voluntarily 
submitted to IAEA safeguards in varying degrees. In the case of the US and the UK it was all civilian plants and 
only specific facilities in the case of France, China, and Russia. 
5. This right was eenshrined under Article IV of the NPT. 
6. This was partly because most of these states were already protected by security assurances provided by the US 
and were covered under the American nuclear umbrella and party because the nuclear-weapon-states too had 
undertaken in good faith to negotiate to work towards nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. 
7. The precise language that the Agency uses in its annual Safeguards Implementation Report uses the format that 
“the IAEA concluded that during (year) that in the (x number of) states have safeguards agreements in force, 
nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were 
otherwise adequately accounted for” and that the Agency “found no indication of diversion of nuclear material 
placed under safeguards, nor of misuse of facilities, equipment of non-nuclear material placed under safeguards”
8. This was the meaning of (INFCIRC/153 paragraph 73b) in providing for special inspections if the Agency 
considers that information made available by the state and obtained from routine inspections is not adequate for 
the Agency to ensure that safeguards will be applied “on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful 
nuclear activities” in the state (INFCIRC.153, paragraph 2).
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